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Introduction
Dividing a fixed amount of resources among members of a society to achieve efficiency and fairness is a central theme of social decision making. The first constructive solution to the problem of dividing a "cake" fairly was provided by Steinhaus [48] . Here, cake is simply a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible commodity, and subsequently, the problem was formulated elegantly in Dubins and Spanier [11] as a partitioning problem in a measure space in which the preferences of each individual for pieces of a cake are represented by a nonatomic probability measure. Although the mathematical problem under investigation has attracted considerable attention in recent years, it has a long history. For the historical background, see [4, Chapter 1] and [6, Chapter 2] . Regarding the existence of various solutions for efficiency and fairness and the construction of the protocol/algorithm to obtain fair solutions, satisfactory results have been obtained under the additivity of preferences of each individual; see [4, 11, 50] for the nonconstructive existence of solutions and [6, 38] for the construction of the protocol/algorithm for fair solutions.
Incidentally, representing preference relations on a σ-algebra by means of a probability measure means that the utility function inevitably exhibits "constant marginal utility". This implies that given an additional element X in a σ-algebra Σ, the utility function ν on Σ given by a probability measure satisfies ν(A ∪ X) − ν(A) = ν(X) for every A ∈ Σ that is disjoint from X, which reveals that the marginal utility is independent of A. Obviously, this is a severe restriction on preference relations that is difficult to justify from an economics point of view. Thus, the reasonable conditions under which the preferences of each individual can have nonadditive representations should be addressed for the fair division problems. For earlier attempts to axiomatize the preference relations on a finite measure space with their continuous representation by means of a nonadditive measure, see [8, 44] .
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we axiomatize preference relations on σ-algebras to vectorize them in a Banach space and furnish a utility representation in terms of a nonadditive measure that satisfies the appropriate requirement of continuity and convexity, which presents a different approach from [8, 44] with a scalarization of preference relations by means of a nonatomic finite measure. The axioms we introduce here guarantee that the utility functions on a σ-algebra are continuous quasiconcave transformations of a vector measure with values in a Banach space, which provides an axiomatic foundation of the nonadditive utility functions exploited in [17, 18, 20, 39] for the fair division problems. In particular, if the underlying measure space is "saturated" as formulated in [13, 16, 22] , then such a utility representation is always viable in a separable Banach space along with the Lyapunov convexity theorem in infinite dimensions established in [24, 26, 27] . This utility representation has a great advantage because the preference relations on a σ-algebra have a continuous convex extension to the set of measurable functions with values in the unit interval. We characterize the saturation of measure spaces in terms of the continuous extensions of preference relations on σ-algebras.
Second, we investigate the fair division problems in which each individual has nonadditive preferences on a σ-algebra invoking our utility representation result. If the preferences of each individual are represented by a nonatomic probability measure, then the classical Lyapunov convexity theorem [30] guarantees the compactness and convexity of the utility possibility set and thereby makes it possible to establish the existence of solutions with respect to efficiency and fairness; see [4, 11, 50] . In consideration of nonadditive utility functions on σ-algebras, such favorable properties are no longer valid. For the clarification of the role of the nonatomicity hypothesis in the fair division problems with additive utility functions on σ-algebras, see the survey article [41] .
To overcome the difficulty with nonadditive utility functions on σ-algebras, as in [1, 7, 20] , we subsume a partition economy in which the preferences of each individual are vectorized in a Banach space into an allocation economy with the commodity space of L ∞ in which the preferences of each individual on a σ-algebra are continuously extended to the subset of functions in L ∞ with values in the unit interval. We clarify the role of saturation of the underlying measure space to formulate the indifference relation for each individual between partitions and allocations, which provides another characterization of saturation. Under the saturation hypothesis, we show the existence of individually rational Pareto optimal partitions without any convexity assumption on the preferences of each individual and the existence of Walrasian equilibria, core partitions, and Pareto optimal envy-free partitions under the convexity assumption.
The paper is organized as follows. After the brief introduction of saturated measure spaces and the Lyapunov convexity theorem in separable Banach spaces in Section 2, the axiomatization for the vectorized preference relations on a σ-algebra is given in Section 3. The fair division problems are framed in Section 4 and the existence results in partition economies are provided under the saturation hypothesis. Lastly, an open question is stated in Section 5 as a concluding remark.
Preliminaries

Lyapunov Convexity Theorem in Saturated Measure Spaces
Throughout this paper, we always assume that (Ω, Σ, µ) is a finite measure space. A measure space (Ω, Σ, µ) is said to be essentially countably generated if its σ-algebra can be generated by a countable number of subsets together with the null sets; (Ω, Σ, µ) is said to be essentially uncountably generated whenever it is not essentially countably generated. Let Σ X = {X∩A | A ∈ Σ} be the σ-algebra restricted to X ∈ Σ. Denote by L 1 (X, Σ X , µ) the space of µ-integrable functions on the measurable space (X, Σ X ) whose elements are restrictions of functions in L 1 (Ω, Σ, µ) to X. An equivalence relation ≡ on Σ is given by A ≡ B ⇐⇒ µ(A△B) = 0, where A△B is the symmetric difference of A and B in Σ. The collection of equivalence classes is denoted by Σ(µ) = Σ/ ≡ and its generic element A is the equivalence class of A ∈ Σ. The metric ρ on Σ(µ) is defined by ρ( A, B) = µ(A△B). Then (Σ(µ), ρ) is a complete metric space (see [2, Lemma 13.13] ) and (Σ(µ), ρ) is separable if and only if L 1 (Ω, Σ, µ) is separable (see [2, Lemma 13.14]). The density of (Σ(µ), ρ) is the smallest cardinal number of the form |U|, where U is a dense subset of Σ(µ). Definition 2.1. A finite measure space (Ω, Σ, µ) is saturated if L 1 (X, Σ X , µ) is nonseparable for every X ∈ Σ with µ(X) > 0. We say that a finite measure space has the saturation property if it is saturated. Saturation implies nonatomicity and several equivalent definitions for saturation are known; see [13, 14, 16, 22] . One of the simple characterizations of the saturation property is as follows. A finite measure space (Ω, Σ, µ) is saturated if and only if (X, Σ X , µ) is essentially uncountably generated for every X ∈ Σ with µ(X) > 0. The saturation of finite measure spaces is also synonymous with the uncountability of the density of Σ X (µ) for every X ∈ Σ with µ(X) > 0; see [14, 331Y(e) ]. An inceptive notion of saturation already appeared in [21, 31] .
Let E be a Banach space. For a vector measure m : Σ → E, a set N ∈ Σ is said to be m-null if m(A ∩ N) = 0 for every A ∈ Σ. A vector measure m : Σ → E is said to be µ-continuous (or absolutely continuous with respect to µ) if every µ-null set is m-null.
, which is a weakly * compact, convex subset of L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ), and define m(S) := { f dm ∈ E | f ∈ S}. Since the integration operator T m : L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ) → E defined by T m (f ) := f dm is continuous with respect to the weak * topology of L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ) and the weak topology of E (see [10, Lemma IX.1.3] ), the set m(S) is weakly compact and convex in E.
The saturation property and the Lyapunov convexity theorem in separable Banach spaces are a major apparatus in this paper.
Proposition 2.1 (Khan and Sagara [24] ). Let E be a separable Banach space. If (Ω, Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E, its range m(Σ) is weakly compact and convex with m(Σ) = m(S). Conversely, if every µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E has the weakly compact convex range, then (Ω, Σ, µ) is saturated whenever E is infinite dimensional.
Remark 2.1. The significance of the saturation property lies in the fact that it is necessary and sufficient for the weak compactness and the convexity of the Bochner integral of a multifunction as well as the Lyapunov convexity theorem; see [24, 25, 26, 27, 37, 49] . For the further generalization of Proposition 2.1 to nonseparable locally convex spaces, see [15, 26, 27, 43] . Another intriguing characterization of saturation in terms of the existence of Nash equilibria in large games is found in [22] . A preference relation on Σ satisfying Axiom 3.1 is said to admit a vectorization in E. A vector measure that guarantees a vectorization for is not unique because its scalar multiplication is consistent with Axiom 3.1. In addition, the observation that may admit a vectorization in another Banach space motivates one to introduce the following axiom. (In what follows, we assume that admits a vectorization in a Banach space E via a µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E.) Axiom 3.2 (commutativity). If admits another vectorization in a Banach space F via a µ-continuous vector measure n : Σ → F , then there exists a unique continuous linear operator T : E → F such that n = T • m.
By the symmetric treatment of E and F , the axiom guarantees that there exists a unique continuous linear operator U :
A preference relation on Σ satisfying Axiom 3.2 is said to admit commutativity in E. Commutativity guarantees that the pair of a Banach space and a vector measure admitting vectorization for is unique up to the equivalence in the following sense. Let V(Σ, µ) be the set of µ-continuous vector measures on Σ with values in any Banach space. A typical element in V(Σ, µ) is denoted by (m, E) to distinguish explicitly the range spaces of vector measures. Define the equivalence relation on V(Σ, µ) by (m, E) ≃ (n, F ) def ⇐⇒ there exists a unique pair of continuous linear operators T : E → F and U : F → E such that n = T • m and m = U • n. As defined in (3.1), the commutativity for yields an induced preference relation Q on n(Σ). Thus, for every x, y ∈ m(Σ): x R y ⇐⇒ T x Q T y and for every v, w ∈ n(Σ): v Q w ⇐⇒ Uv R Uw. The axiom is equivalent to the monotonicity of R on m(Σ): for every x, y ∈ m(Σ) with x + y ∈ m(Σ) and y = 0, we have x + y R x, but not x R x + y. A preference relation on Σ satisfying Axiom 3.3 is said to admit a monotone vectorization in E.
Axiom 3.4 (continuity). For every
The axiom is equivalent to the continuity of R on m(Σ): for every x ∈ m(Σ), both the upper contour set {y ∈ m(Σ) | y R x} and the lower contour set {y ∈ m(Σ) | x R y} are closed in m(Σ). A preference relation on Σ satisfying Axiom 3.4 is said to admit a continuous vectorization in E.
The axiom is equivalent to the convexity of R on m(Σ): for every x ∈ m(Σ), the upper contour set {y ∈ m(Σ) | y R x} is convex. A preference relation on Σ satisfying Axiom 3.5 is said to admit a convex vectorization in E. Note that the convexity of m(Σ) is not automatic even when m is nonatomic because of the well-known failure of the Lyapunov convexity theorem in infinite dimensions (for counterexamples in which the Lyapunov convexity theorem fails in infinite dimensions, see [10, Examples IX.1.1 and IX.1.2]). 
Utility Functions on Σ
If, furthermore, admits commutativity, then the continuous (and convex) vectorization via (m, E) ∈ V(Σ, µ) is unique up to the equivalence classes in
Proof. Suppose that admits a continuous (and convex) vectorization in a separable Banach space E. Then there exists a µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E (with m(Σ) being convex) such that (3.1) holds. Since the induced preference relation R on m(Σ) is continuous (and convex) and E is separable, by the celebrated theorem of Debreu [9] , there exists a continuous (and quasiconcave) function ϕ : m(Σ) → R representing the preference relation R on m(Σ), that is, x R y ⇐⇒ ϕ(x) ≥ ϕ(y). Therefore, ϕ • m is a utility function on Σ representing the preference relation on Σ. By replacing ϕ(x) with ϕ(x) − ϕ(0) if necessary, without loss of generality one may assume that ϕ(0) = 0. The converse implication is obvious without assuming the separability of E.
Denote by L 
is a Radon-Nikodym derivative of ν. In this specific case, admits a continuous convex scalarization with a quasiconcave integral transformation on Σ.
Remark 3.1. Note that the proof of Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that if (Ω, Σ, µ) is a nonatomic finite measure space, then admits a continuous (and convex) vectorization in R l if and only if there exist a µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → R l with its range m(Σ) being compact and convex and a continuous (and quasiconcave) function ϕ : m(Σ) → R with ϕ(0) = 0 satisfying (3.2). This is an immediate consequence of the classical Lyapunov convexity theorem in view of the nonatomicity of m.
Continuous Extensions to S
Denote by χ A the characteristic function of A ∈ Σ. Then χ A ∈ S for every A ∈ Σ. A preference relation ⋄ on S is a complete transitive binary relation on S. A preference relation ⋄ is said to be continuous if for every f ∈ S both the upper contour set {g ∈ S | g ⋄ f } and the lower contour set {g ∈ S | f ⋄ g} are weakly * closed in S; ⋄ is said to be convex if for every f ∈ S the upper contour set {g ∈ S | g ⋄ f } is convex; ⋄ is said to be monotone if f ≥ g with f = g imply f ≻ g;
⋄ is called an extension of the preference relation on Σ if for every A, B ∈ Σ: χ A ⋄ χ B ⇐⇒ A B. If is represented by a utility function of the form ϕ • m on Σ, where m is a µ-continuous vector measure with values in a Banach space E (with m(Σ) being convex) and ϕ is a continuous (and quasiconcave) function on m(Σ) with a continuous (and quasiconcave) extension ϕ ⋄ to m(S), then the continuous (and convex) extension ⋄ of to S is given by:
The continuous (and convex) extension ⋄ defined in this way is called a (quasiconcave) integral transformation on S. Then the utility function
is weakly * continuous (and quasiconcave) on S in view of the fact that the integration operator T m is continuous with respect to the weak * topology of L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ) and the weak topology of E, as noted above.
Theorem 3.2. Let (Ω, Σ, µ) be a saturated finite measure space. Then every preference relation on Σ with a continuous vectorization in a separable Banach space has a continuous extension ⋄ to S with an integral transformation such that for every f ∈ S there exists A ∈ Σ satisfying f ∼ ⋄ χ A .
Proof. Let be a preference relation on Σ that admits a continuous vectorization in a separable Banach space E. By Theorem 3.1, has a utility function of the form ϕ • m, where m is a µ-continuous vector measure with values in a separable Banach space E and ϕ is a continuous function on m(Σ). In view of Proposition 2.1, m(Σ) = m(S), and hence, the desired extension ⋄ of to S is given by the formula (3.3) with ϕ = ϕ ⋄ .
The converse of Theorem 3.2 is true in the following sense, which provides another characterization of saturation. Proof. Suppose that (Ω, Σ, µ) is not saturated. Then for every infinitedimensional Banach space E, there exists a µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E such that its range m(Σ) is not convex; see [37, Lemma 4] and [49, Remark 1] . Then there exist x, y ∈ m(Σ) and t ∈ (0, 1) such that tx + (1 − t)y ∈ m(Σ). Let C, D ∈ Σ be such that x = m(C) and y = m(D) and definef := tχ C + (1 − t)χ D ∈ S. Let ϕ ⋄ : m(S) → R be a continuous function with ϕ ⋄ (0) = 0 that attains the maximum at the unique point x := f dm ∈ m(S) (such a function can be simply given by, for instance, the strictly concave continuous function ϕ ⋄ (z) = x − x − z ). Define the preference relation ⋄ on S via (3.3) and denote its restriction to Σ by . Then admits a continuous vectorization in the Banach space E by Theorem 3.1 (the separability of E is unnecessary here) and ⋄ is a continuous extension of with an integral transformation. Hence, there exists A ∈ Σ such thatf ∼ ⋄ χ A . This means that ϕ ⋄ (x) = ϕ ⋄ (m(A)), and hence,
Remark 3.2. The continuous extension of nonadditive measures on Σ to S with an integral transformation explored in Theorem 3.2 is a further improvement of [19] under the saturation hypothesis incorporating infinite dimensional vectorization. An alternative formulation of the convexity of preference relations on σ-algebras and their representation in terms of a nonadditive measure with the quasiconcavity-like property based on the Lyapunov convexity theorem in finite dimensions were studied in [44] . For continuous concave extensions of nonadditive measures to L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ) based on Choquet integrals and the support functionals of the cores of exact games, see [42] . The problem of dividing a heterogeneous commodity among a finite number of individuals is formulated as partitioning in a finite measure space (Ω, Σ, µ). Here, the set Ω is a heterogeneous divisible commodity, the σ-algebra Σ of subsets of Ω denotes the collection of possible pieces of Ω, and the finite measure µ describes an objective evaluation for a cardinal attribute of each piece in Σ. There are n individuals and the set of individuals is denoted by I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, each of whom is indexed by i ∈ I, whose preference relation i is defined on a common consumption set Σ. Each individual possesses an initial endowment Ω i ∈ Σ, for which Ω i ∩ Ω j = ∅ for each i = j and n i=1 Ω i = Ω. A partition of Ω is an ordered n-tuple (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of mutually disjoint sets A 1 , . . . , A n in Σ whose union is Ω, where each A i is a share of the divisible commodity Ω given to individual i ∈ I. Thus, (Ω 1 , . . . , Ω n ) is an initial partition of Ω. A partition economy
} consists of the commodity space (Ω, Σ, µ), the common consumption set Σ, on which a preference relation i is defined for each i ∈ I, and the initial endowment Ω i of each individual.
} be a partition economy. A partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of Ω is said to be:
(ii) Pareto optimal if there is no partition (B 1 , . . . , B n ) such that
for each i ∈ I and A j ≻ j B j for some j ∈ I;
A nonempty subset of I is called a coalition. The family of coalitions is denoted by I with its typical element denoted by S ∈ I. A partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of Ω is called an S-partition if i∈S A i = i∈S Ω i .
} be a partition economy. A coalition S ∈ I is said to improve upon a partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of Ω if there exists an S-partition (B 1 , . . . , B n ) such that B i ≻ i A i for each i ∈ S. A partition of Ω that cannot be improved upon by any coalition is called a core partition in E P .
Let ba(Σ, µ) be the space of finitely additive signed measures vanishing on µ-null sets, which is the price space for the heterogeneous divisible commodity (Ω, Σ, µ). A price p ∈ ba(Σ, µ) is said to be positive if p(A) ≥ 0 for every A ∈ Σ and p = 0. Given price p ∈ ba(Σ, µ), the budget set of each individual is given by
} be a partition economy. A price-partition pair (p, (A 1 , . . . , A n )) is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium if A i ∈ Σ is a maximal element for i on B i (p, Ω i ) for each i ∈ I.
Denote by P the set of partitions of Ω, by P IR the set of individually rational partitions, by P PO the set of Pareto optimal partitions, by P EF the set of envy-free partitions, by P C the set of core partitions, and by P W the set of Walrasian partitions respectively in E P . Then the inclusion P W ⊂ P C ⊂ P IR ∩ P PO is trivial by definition.
In what follows, we assume that each i admits a continuous vectorization in a separable Banach space E i . In view of Theorem 3.1, each i is represented by a utility function ϕ i • m i on Σ, where m i : Σ → E i is a µ-continuous vector measure and ϕ i : m i (Σ) → R is a continuous function. The utility function of this form means that each individual evaluates any measurable subset A of the heterogeneous divisible commodity (Ω, Σ, µ) in terms of the subjective cardinal attribute m i (A) vectorized in E i . When E i = R l i , there are l i cardinal attributes for the heterogeneous divisible commodity that is significant to individual i, which is the specification modelled in [17, 18, 19, 39] .
Allocation Economies in
Following [1, 7, 19] , we subsume partition economies into allocation econo mies. An ordered n-tuple (f 1 , .
f i (ω) = 1 for every ω ∈ Ω and f i ∈ S for each i ∈ I. Every A ∈ Σ is identified with its characteristic function χ A in S. Note that (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is a partition of Ω if and only if (χ A 1 , . . . , χ An ) is an allocation of χ Ω . An allocation economy
} consists of the commodity space L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ), the common consumption set S, on which a preference relation ⋄ i is defined for each i ∈ I, and the initial endowment χ Ω i ∈ S of each individual.
If each ⋄ i is an extension of i to S given a partition economy
} is called an extension of E P . If i is represented by a utility function of the form ϕ i •m i on Σ, where m i is a µ-continuous vector measure and ϕ i is a continuous function on m(Σ) that has an continuous extension ϕ ⋄ i to m i (S), then a continuous extension ⋄ i to S with an integral transformation of the preference relation i on Σ is given by the formula (3.3). In this case, an allocation economy E A is called a continuous extension of E P with an integral transformation.
} be an allocation economy. An allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of χ Ω is said to be:
(ii) Pareto optimal if there is no allocation (g 1 , . . . , g n ) such that g i ⋄ i f i for each i ∈ I and g j ≻ ⋄ j f j for some j ∈ I;
For a coalition S ∈ I, an allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of χ Ω is called an S-
} be an allocation economy. A coalition S ∈ I is said to improve upon an allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) of χ Ω if there exists an S- allocation (g 1 , . . . , g n ) such that g i ≻ ⋄ i f i for each i ∈ S. An allocation of χ Ω that cannot be improved upon by any coalition is called a core allocation in E A .
The dual space of L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ) is ba(Σ, µ), whose duality relation is denoted by p, f = f dp for p ∈ ba(Σ, µ) and f ∈ L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ). Given price p ∈ ba(Σ, µ), the budget set of each individual is given by
} be an allocation economy. A price-allocation pair (p, (f 1 , . . . , f n )) is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium if f i is a maximal element for i on B
Denote by A the set of partitions of χ Ω , by A IR the set of individually rational partitions, by A PO the set of Pareto optimal partitions, by A EF the set of envy-free partitions, by A C the set of core allocations, and by A W the set of Walrasian allocations respectively in E A . Then the inclusion A W ⊂ A C ⊂ A IR ∩ A PO is trivial by definition. As mentioned above, the inclusion P ⊂ A is automatic for every partition economy E A and every allocation economy E P . If E A is an extension of E P , then the inclusions P IR ⊂ A IR and P EF ⊂ A EF hold.
Since an allocation economy E A is nothing but an exchange economy with commodity space L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ), the existence of Walrasian equilibria for E A simply follows from exactly the same argument as in [5] if one imposes Mackey continuity and convexity on each ⋄ i . In the proof of Theorem 4.5 below, we demonstrate the existence of Walrasian equilibria in E A in a more specific setting.
A Characterization of Saturation
The power of saturation is exemplified in the indifference relation between partitions in E P and allocations in the continuous extension E A of the original economy E P . The proof presented here is based on the Lyapunov convexity theorem in separable Banach spaces (Proposition 2.1) and the extreme point argument in the weakly * compact subset of L ∞ inspired by a functional analytic approach originated in [29] and then explored in [1, 19] . Theorem 4.1. Let (Ω, Σ, µ) be a saturated finite measure space. Then every partition economy E P = {(Ω, Σ, µ), ( i , Ω i ) n i=1 } for which each i admits a continuous vectorization in a separable Banach space has a continuous ex-
} with an integral transformation such that for every allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) in the allocation economy E A , there exists a partition (A 1 , . . 
} with an integral transformation determined by the formula (3.3). Then as demonstrated in [20, Lemma 3.2] , by the Banach-Alaoglu theorem [12, Corollary V.4.4] , A is weakly
Since each (g 1 , . . . , g n ). We claim that each of g i is a characteristic function. Suppose, to the contrary, that g j is not a characteristic function for some j. By virtue of the fact that n i=1 g i = 1 and g i ≥ 0 for each i ∈ I, we may assume without loss of generality that there exist ε > 0 and A ∈ Σ with µ(A) > 0 such that ε < g 1 , g 2 < 1 − ε on A. Define the µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → R × n i=1 E i by m := (µ, m 1 , . . . , m n ). It follows from Proposition 2.1 that there exists a measurable subset B ⊂ A such that m(B) = m(A)/2. Set h = ε(χ A − 2χ B ). Then h = 0, 0 ≤ g 1 ± h, g 2 ± h ≤ 1, and hdm = 0.
. . , g n ) ∈ A(f 1 , . . . , f n ). This yields:
which means that (g 1 , . . . , g n ) is a convex combination of two distinct elements (g 1 +h, g 2 −h, g 3 , . . . , g n ) and (g 1 −h, g 2 +h, g 3 , . . . , g n ) in A(f 1 , . . . , f n ), an obvious contradiction to the fact that (g 1 , . . . , g n ) is an extreme point in A(f 1 , . . . , f n ).
Corollary 4.1. If E P has a continuous extension E A with an integral transformation, then the inclusions P PO ⊂ A PO and P C ⊂ A C hold whenever (Ω, Σ, µ) is saturated.
Proof. To demonstrate the first inclusion, take any Pareto optimal partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) in E P . If (χ A 1 , . . . , χ An ) is not a Pareto optimal allocation in E A , then there exists another allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) such that f i ⋄ i χ A i for each i ∈ I and f j ≻ ⋄ j χ A j for some j ∈ I. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that there exists a partition (B 1 , . . . , B n ) in E P such that f i ∼ ⋄ i χ B i for each i ∈ I, which yields B i i A i for each i ∈ I and B j ≻ j A j for j, a contradiction to the Pareto optimality of (A 1 , . . . , A n ) in E P .
To demonstrate the second inclusion, take any core partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) in E P . If (χ A 1 , . . . , χ An ) is not a core allocation in E A , then some coalition S ∈ I improves upon (A 1 , . . . , A n ), and hence, there exists an S-allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) such that f i ≻ ⋄ i χ A i for each i ∈ S. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that there exists a partition (B 1 , . . . , B n ) in E P such that f i ∼ ⋄ i χ B i for each i ∈ I, which yields B i ≻ i A i for each i ∈ S, a contradiction to the fact that (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is a core partition in E P .
The following converse of Theorem 4.1 yields an intriguing characterization of saturation in terms of the interplay between the partition economy E P with continuously vectorized preference relations in Banach spaces and the allocation economy E A that is a continuous extension of E P with an integral transformation. 
} for which each i admits a continuous vectorization in an infinite-dimensional Banach space and its continuous ex-
} with an integral transformation are such that for every allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) in the allocation economy E A there exists a partition
Proof. Suppose that (Ω, Σ, µ) is not saturated. As noted in the proof of Theorem 3.3, for every infinite-dimensional Banach space E, there exists a µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E such that its range m(Σ) is not convex. Then there exist x, y ∈ m(Σ) and t ∈ (0, 1) such that tx+(1−t)y ∈ m(Σ). Let C, D ∈ Σ be such that x = m(C) and y = m(D) and define f 1 := tχ C + (1 − t)χ D ∈ S and f j := (n−1) 
} is a partition economy for which each i admits a continuous vectorization in the common Banach space E by Theorem 3.1 and the allocation economy 1 )) , and hence, x 1 = tx + (1 − t)y = m(A 1 ) ∈ m(Σ), a contradiction.
Existence Results
We first show under the saturation hypothesis the existence of individually rational Pareto optimal partitions in a partition economy without any convexity assumption on the preferences of each individual. Theorem 4.3. If (Ω, Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every partition economy
} for which each i admits a continuous vectorization in a separable Banach space, there exists an individually rational Pareto optimal partition in E P .
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that the partition economy E P has a continuous extension
} with an integral transformation such that for every allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) in the allocation economy E A , there exists a partition ( 
The individual rationality of a solution (f 1 , . . . , f n ) to (P) is obvious. If (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is not Pareto optimal, then there is another allocation (g 1 , . . . , g n ) such that g i ⋄ i f i for each i ∈ I and g j ≻ ⋄ j f j for some j ∈ I. This means that
, a contradiction to the fact that (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a solution to (P). Therefore, any partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) satisfying f i ∼ ⋄ i χ A i for each i ∈ I is an individually rational Pareto optimal partition in E P .
For the existence of core partitions in a partition economy, the convexity of preferences of each individual are imposed additionally. 
} for which each i admits a continuous convex vectorization in a separable Banach space, there exists a core partition in E P .
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that the partition economy E P has a continuous convex extension
} with a quasiconcave integral transformation such that for every allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) in the allocation economy E A , there exists a partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) in E P satisfying f i ∼ R n with nontransferrable utility (NTU) for the allocation economy E A is a set-valued mapping defined by:
By construction, V (S) is the subset of the utility possibility set of the individuals in which payoff vectors are attainable via some coalition S ∈ I. The core C(V ) of the NTU game V is given by:
By the celebrated theorem of Scarf [47] , C(V ) is nonempty if V is comprehensive below and balanced, V (S) is closed and bounded from above for every S ∈ I, and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n , y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ V (S) and x i = y i for each i ∈ S imply x ∈ V (S). We show that V satisfies these conditions.
It is easy to see that each V (S) is comprehensive from below, i.e., x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n , y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ V (S) and x i ≤ y i for each i ∈ I imply x ∈ V (S). Since each ν ⋄ i is weakly * continuous, and hence, bounded on the weakly * compact set S, for each S ∈ I there exists M S ∈ R such that x i ≤ M S for every x ∈ V (S) and i ∈ S.
We shall show that V is a balanced game. To this end, let B be a balanced family of I with balanced weights {λ S ≥ 0 | S ∈ B} and let B i = {S ∈ B | i ∈ S}. We then have S∈B i λ S = 1 for each i ∈ I. Define:
Then, we have:
Choose any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ S∈B V (S). Then, for every S ∈ B, there exists an S-allocation (f
we have x ∈ V (I). Therefore, S∈B V (S) ⊂ V (I), and consequently, V is balanced.
We finally show that V (S) is closed for every S ∈ B. Let {x k } k∈N be a sequence in V (S) converging to x ∈ R n . Then, there exists an allocation (f
It is easy to verify that (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is an S-allocation. Thus, we obtain x ∈ V (S), and hence, V (S) is closed.
Since C(V ) is nonempty, one can choose an element (x 1 , . . . , x n ) in C(V ). Then there exists an I-allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) such that
which contradicts the fact that (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is in C(V ). Let (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be in C(V ) and define the set A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) by:
It follows from the above argument that A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a nonempty subset of A C . Since A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is nonempty and weakly * compact in [L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ)] n , according to the Krein-Milman theorem, A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) has an extreme point (g 1 , . . . , g n ). Precisely in the same way with the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can show that each g i is a characteristic function. Therefore, there exists a partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of Ω such that (χ A 1 , . . . , χ An ) ∈ A(x 1 , . . . , x n ). This means that (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is a core partition in E P .
For the existence of Walrasian equilibria in a partition economy with a positive price, the monotonicity of preferences of each individual are imposed further.
Theorem 4.5. If (Ω, Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every partition economy
} for which each i admits a continuous convex monotone vectorization in a separable Banach space, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium with a positive price in E P .
Proof. By Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 3.1, the partition economy E P has a continuous convex extension
quasiconcave integral transformation such that each (f 1 , . . . ,f n )) with positive pricep in E A . Define the set of Walrasian allocations associated with the equilibrium pricep by:
Then A W (p) is nonempty and weakly
n . According to the Krein-Milman theorem, A W (p) has an extreme point (g 1 , . . . , g n ).
Precisely in the same way as the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can show that each g i is a characteristic function. Therefore, there exists a partition (Â 1 , . . . ,Â n ) of Ω such that (χÂ Under the same assumption as Theorem 4.5 the existence of Pareto optimal envy-free partitions in E P is guaranteed. Theorem 4.6. If (Ω, Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every partition economy
} for which each i admits a continuous convex monotone vectorization in a separable Banach space, there exists a Pareto optimal envy-free partition in E P .
} be a continuous convex extension of E P with a quasiconcave integral transformation such that for every allocation (f 1 , . . . , f n ) in the allocation economy E A , there exists a partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) in E P satisfying f i ∼ ⋄ i χ A i for each i ∈ I. Consider the allocation economy E A = {L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ), S, (
, n −1 χ Ω } in which each individual possesses the equal initial endowment n −1 χ Ω ∈ S. Then a Walrasian equilibrium (p, (f 1 , . . . ,f n )) with positive pricep in E A exists as proved in Theorem 4.5. The Walrasian allocation (f 1 , . . . ,f n ) is Pareto optimal in E A (because of the the first welfare theorem) and in view of the equal budget set among all individuals, it is evidently envy free in E A . Take any partition (Ā 1 , . . . ,Ā n ) in E P satisfyingf i ∼ ⋄ i χĀ i for each i ∈ I. If (Ā 1 , . . . ,Ā n ) is not Pareto optimal in E P , then there exists another partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) such that A i iĀi for each i ∈ I and A j ≻ jĀj for some j ∈ I. This means that χĀ i ⋄ if i or each i ∈ I and χĀ j ⋄ jf j for j, a contradiction to the Pareto optimality of (f 1 , . . . ,f n ) in E A . Hence, (Ā 1 , . . . ,Ā n ) is a Pareto optimal partition in E P . If (Ā 1 , . . . ,Ā n ) is not envy free in E P , thenĀ j ≻ iĀi for some i = j. This implies thatf j ≻ ⋄ if i , a contradiction to the fact that (f 1 , . . . ,f n ) is envy free in E A .
Remark 4.1. To obtain a countably additive equilibrium price in Theorem 4.5, the same argument as in [5] , which uses the Yosida-Hewitt decomposition in ba(Σ, µ), is valid. In particular, if the allocation economy E A is such that each Remark 4.2. For a partition economy E P in which each i admits a continuous vectorization in R l i , the existence of Walrasian equilibria (see [18] ), the nonemptiness of the core (see [17, 39] ), the nonemptiness of the fuzzy core and the existence of supporting prices (see [19] ), and the existence of Pareto optimal α-fair partitions (see [41] ) were established under the convexity hypothesis on i . Under the alternative continuity hypothesis on i , the existence of Pareto optimal envy-free partitions was given in [20] without any convexity hypothesis on i . For other solution concepts regarding the fair partition problems, see [40, 41, 45, 46] .
Concluding Remarks
We conclude this paper by raising an open problem. We leave aside the existence of supporting prices for Pareto optimal partitions under the convexity assumption. The existence of supporting prices in L 1 (Ω, Σ, µ) was obtained in [19] with a finite-dimensional vectorization. The problem is a standard application of the separation theorem in L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ). It should be noted that thanks to Theorem 4.1, supporting prices in an allocation economy are automatically the ones in a partition economy. As demonstrated in Theorem 4.3, however, for the existence of Pareto optimal partitions, the convexity assumption is unnecessary. Thus, the challenging problem is instead to demonstrate the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics for partition economies without any convexity assumption. For nonconvex production economies with an infinite-dimensional commodity space, [28] derived a price system in the Clarke normal cone that is consistent with a Pareto optimal allocation, and their result covers the commodity space of L ∞ (Ω, Σ, µ). It is well-known that in the presence of nonconvexity Clarke normal cones are strictly larger than Mordukhovitz normal cones (see [35] ), so that price systems in the latter are called for to derive sharper necessary conditions for Pareto optimality. It is [23] who first introduced Mordukhovitz normal cones to obtain the second welfare theorem into finite-dimensional nonconvex production economies. For the extension of [23] to Banach or Asplund spaces of commodities, see [3, 32, 33, 34, 36] . The second welfare theorem without convexity assumptions specific to partition economies based on Mordukhovitz normal cones is still unknown.
